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Abstract
Introduction
Prior to 2004, Danish cannabis policy was
lenient on users and street-level markets.
Possession offences and retail sales were
not policed actively. The relatively low
levels of control were part of traditional
Danish drug policy that rested on the
assertion that police resources were best
spent on hard drugs and wholesalers
(Brydensholt 1972; Storgaard 2000). This
leniency came under political and inter-
national pressure when cannabis use
increased among youth throughout the
1990s. At the onset of the 2000s cannabis
was widely and visibly for sale in Denmark,
especially in the capital Copenhagen. More
than 100 storefront locations, known as
‘hash-clubs’, were spread around the city,
and an area known as ‘Pusher Street’ in
Christiania contained the largest street-
level retail market in Europe (Moeller
2009). Denmark currently has the highest
In 2004 Danish cannabis policy
moved away from a tradition of
harm reduction and towards a
focus on deterring buyers and
sellers in street-level retail
markets. This article examines
two research questions regarding
the unintended consequences
from policing the new policy.
The data consist of police drug
seizures by district, and criminal
statistics on the national origin of
people who have been sanctioned
with a fine for a drug law
misdemeanour.
The first unintended conse-
quence is analysed as a policy
displacement following the
increased focus on the lower
levels of distribution. This is
tested in a fixed effects
regression model using the
association between number of
drug seizures and seized
amount. For cannabis, there
is a significant negative
relationship between within-
police district number of seizures
and within-police district
amounts (beta ¼ 2 .34, p ¼
.001). For all other drugs, there
is no significant association.
Secondly, from 2000 to 2008
police have dispensed almost
30,000 fines for drug law
misdemeanours in Copenhagen
alone, mostly for cannabis
possession offences. Persons
of non-Western origin are
disproportionately represented
compared to their share of
population. A research question
is posed that asks if the proactive
policing of consensual illicit
behaviour is associated with an
increased ethnic disparity when
number of sanctions increase.
The correlation was found to
be significant at .90 (n ¼ 6,
p , 0.01).
This study highlights two
areas of unintended consequences
that have been associated with
the increased police focus on
cannabis possession offences in
Denmark. Firstly the increase in
number of cannabis seizures has
been followed by a decreased
amount of cannabis seized.
Secondly as the number of fines
for misdemeanour drug offences
increased, the proportion of
persons of non-Western origin
among the sanctioned also
increased.
KEY WORDS: Cannabis policy,
Copenhagen, Ethnic disparity,
Policing, Policy displacement
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lifetime prevalence of cannabis use in
Europe (Focal Point 2008; EMCDDA
2009; MULD 2009).
Political action was taken in 2003 with
the presentation of the government action
plan, The Fight against Drugs. The action
plan was the first of its kind since 1994 and
had three central elements as concerns
cannabis: to curtail cannabis access for
inexperienced users, to reduce the profit-
ability of street-level retail sales, and
ultimately break with a burgeoning ‘nor-
malization’ of cannabis (Parker et al.
2002; Parker 2005; Järvinen and Demant
forthcoming). The principles of this new
policy can be said to rest on deterrence
theory with the ambition of reducing use.
By sanctioning and stigmatizing cannabis
users, societal norms against cannabis are
reinforced (Christie and Bruun 1985/1996;
Caulkins and Reuter 2006; Acevedo 2007;
Caulkins and Menefee 2009; Caulkins and
Reuter 2009).
The intentions put forth in the action
plan were formalized with new legislation
in 2004 (Skærpet indsats mod narkotika
[Stricter Effort against Drugs] 2004).
Notably the penalization level for canna-
bis possession offences was increased.
Prior to 2004, possession of up to 10 g
of cannabis was considered personal use
and was sanctioned with a warning.
Although a warning is technically a
criminal sanction (Greve 2004), it was
not perceived as having sufficient deterrent
effects. Also the low levels of penalization
infringed the common sense of justice.
With the law from 2004 the starting-point
sanction was increased to a fine, and in
2007 the fine level was quadrupled to its
present level of 250 euros (Rigsadvokaten
[State Attorney] 2006, with corrections
2007).
Shortly after the law was passed, the
intentions were implemented in crack-
downs on known street-level markets,
first Christiania’s cannabis market and
two years later on a market known as
Lithuania’s Square. Since 2004 police have
maintained enforcement pressure on can-
nabis users and sellers by issuing fines for
possession offences. It is important to note
that it was expressly stated in the prepara-
tory legislative work that the crack-downs
and enforcement of the user sanctions were
expected to be within regular police
budgetary allocations.
Research on drug law enforcement
indicates that intensive enforcement of a
deterrence-based policy will potentially
have five types of unintended conse-
quences: (1) it stimulates the criminal
black market, (2) it can lead to geographic
adaptability, (3) it risks displacing policy,
(4) there are social costs to users, and (5)
potential for substance displacement
(Commission on Narcotic Drugs 2009).
This study examines two of these cat-
egories of unintended consequences fol-
lowing the change of policy in 2004: policy
displacement and the social costs to users.
The first area of unintended conse-
quences to be examined is the potential
for a policy displacement. Rasmussen et al.
presented the ‘criminal justice commons’
argument in a series of studies on the
consequences of increased drug law enfor-
cement. Their argument is that in an
environment of scarce police resources the
opportunity costs of increasing a specific
type of drug law enforcement reduces
efforts to combat other crimes (Rasmussen
et al. 1993; Rasmussen and Benson 1994;
Benson et al. 1995; Benson et al. 1998;
Benson et al. 2001). Specifically they found
that when cocaine arrests increased there
MØLLER: POLICING CANNABIS IN DENMARK
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was also an increase in various forms of
property crimes. Because law enforcement
resources are allocated from a common
pool environment, an increase in one area
will, other things being equal, imply a
decrease in enforcement of other crimes.
Recently Shepard and Blackley (2005,
2007) and Harcourt and Ludwig (2007)
have studied this policy displacement
effect in the case of increased cannabis
enforcement in the US. They found similar
results in that increased cannabis control
efforts were associated with increased
rates of property crimes and hard drug
arrests.
For the present study it will be examined
if the implementation of the new cannabis
policy focused on deterring users and retail
sellers has affected other areas of drug law
enforcement. The crack-downs on street-
level markets lead to a geographic dispersal
of the market. When cannabis transactions
were suppressed in the known markets,
new selling locations appeared in other
areas of Copenhagen (Københavns Kom-
mune 2005; Asmussen and Jepsen 2007;
Rikskriminalpolisen 2007) because drug
markets quickly—and routinely (Eck 1995;
Wood et al. 2004)—adapted to the increase
in enforcement. Geographic dispersal is
commonly referred to as the drug market
‘balloon effect’ (Commission on Narcotic
Drugs 2009:10) that reflects the constant
‘war of attrition’ (Curtis and Wendel
2007:874) between enforcement and mar-
ket participants. With the new deterrence-
based cannabis policy it was a challenge for
law enforcement to maintain a credible
threat of criminal sanctioning in the
dispersed market. Meeting this challenge
runs the risk of drawing police resources
from other areas of drug control, i.e.
displacing policy.
The first research question is posed as
follows: Has the increased focus on
cannabis retail-level distribution after
2004 negatively affected the aggregate
amount of cannabis seized, indicating a
decrease in control of wholesale and
trafficking offences?
The second potential unintended conse-
quence follows from the focus on policing
cannabis misdemeanours at the street level.
The purpose of a deterrence-based canna-
bis policy is a ‘net-widening’ (Cohen 1979;
Caulkins and Reuter 1997), i.e. to bring
more people into contact with the criminal
justice system, in order to make the threat
of punishment credible; this is considered
an intended consequence. For some people,
being sanctioned for a cannabis-related
offence has more far-reaching repercus-
sions than the fine itself. Erickson and
Fischer in Canada found that most indi-
viduals experienced a decline in economic
position a year after sanctioning, unrelated
to the severity of the sanction (Erickson
1980). Since the decline was unrelated to
the severity of the sanction, some people
must experience more severe conse-
quences than others. Studies from the UK
and US have found that immigrants are
disproportionately over-represented
among people sanctioned for cannabis-
related offences (Reuter et al. 2001;
Beckett et al. 2005; Golub et al. 2006;
King and Mauer 2006; Harcourt and
Ludwig 2007; May et al. 2007; Pearson
2007). This over-representation is not
unusual for street-level policing, but none-
theless it is worth examining specifically for
a relatively minor offence like cannabis
possession. This subpopulation is assumed
to experience more serious adverse con-
sequences due to already being margin-
alized: firstly for their labour-market
MØLLER: POLICING CANNABIS IN DENMARK
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attachment (Western 2003) and secondly
the strain caused by a perceived racial bias
(MacCoun 1993; Caulkins and Reuter
1997; Loo et al. 2003; MacCoun et al.
2003). Both consequences make it harder
to reintegrate these offenders, which means
that in the long run it can potentially have
societal consequences as well.
The second research question is posed as
follows: Does the proportion of immi-
grants increase with an increase in the
absolute number of sanctions?
The study contributes to what is known
about the unintended consequences of
implementing a deterrence-based cannabis
policy focused on street-level law enforce-
ment. Several studies have examined the
effects and efficacy of deterrence on
cannabis use rates (Williams 2004; Zie-
denberg and Colburn 2005; Pacula et al.
2007) and cannabis markets (Kleiman
1989; Caulkins and Pacula 2006; Wilkins
and Sweetsur 2006), but only relatively
little research has examined the costs and
effects of street-level policing of cannabis.
The exceptions are a series of recent
anthropological studies (May et al. 2002,
2007; Golub et al. 2005, 2006; Johnson
et al. 2006; Sandberg and Pedersen 2006;
Harcourt and Ludwig 2007; Sandberg
2008). The results from these studies
show that cannabis use rates are affected
indirectly through the price mechanism,
where sellers add a risk premium when
enforcement intensity and sanctioning
levels increase. Unfortunately this also
raises profits for sellers, albeit with more
risk associated. The perceived risks pri-
marily depend on the intensity of enforce-
ment rather than the severity of
punishments, consistent with Becker’s
(1968) deterrence theory. The effects on
use will vary depending on the user’s age
and experience. Younger users tend to
discount the future more, as do heavier
users, so increased risks do not deter these
groups. This also implies that the aggre-
gate size of the market does not decline
with increased enforcement and associ-
ated penalties. As with alcohol and other
drugs, heavy users account for the
majority of total consumption (Reuter
1993; Caulkins and MacCoun 2003;
UNODC 2006).
Compared to the other illicit drugs,
cannabis is under-studied—for valid
reasons: internationally cannabis trans-
actions take place indoors among peers,
many of them gratuitous, and therefore do
not cause the public order disturbances that
usually attract law enforcement and
research interest. Also, the use of cannabis
is not associated with the levels of violence,
deaths, acquisitive crime, and deviance as is
the use of ‘harder’ and more expensive
drugs (MacCoun and Reuter 2001; Wil-
liams 2004; Bennett and Holloway 2009;
Pedersen and Skardhamar 2009). None-
theless increased policing of cannabis is
currently a common feature for many
countries (Kilmer 2002; Loo et al. 2003;
King and Mauer 2006; EMCDDA 2008),
and the issue of how best to regulate
cannabis at the international policy level is
again being discussed in the United Nations
(Commission on Narcotic Drugs 2009). In
a Scandinavian context the traditional
Danish cannabis policy has been an excep-
tion to the stringently repressive policies of
Norway and especially Sweden (Jepsen
1995; Hakkarainen et al. 1996; Laursen
1996; Träskman 2004). The recent changes
point towards a budding Scandinavian
convergence on policing cannabis, and
hopefully there will be interest in following
the results as well as the unintended
MØLLER: POLICING CANNABIS IN DENMARK
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consequences of moving away from
leniency.
Data and methods
Denmark has a population of approxi-
mately 5.4 million people and was divided
into 54 police districts during the period
when the data were collected. Around 1.9
million people live in the greater Copenha-
gen area.
Data used in the analyses are police
statistics on drug seizures (politi.dk) and
criminal statistics on fines for drug mis-
demeanours (dst.dk). Unfortunately it is
not possible to distinguish accurately
cannabis possession offences from other
drug offences in the Danish criminal
statistics, as drug law offences are regis-
tered neither by drug nor by type of offence
(EMCDDA 2009). Two different proxies
are used to examine the research questions.
Seizure data are used as a proxy for drug
law enforcement (Miron 2001), and the
criminal statistics category of drug law
misdemeanours sanctioned with a fine is
used as proxy for cannabis possession
sanctions. Both data sets are only available
from 2000.
The first research question is examined in
a fixed effects regression model. Specifi-
cally, the dependent variable in each model
is the amount of drugs seized per inhabitant
in the police district (in kg for cannabis,
cocaine, heroin, and amphetamine, and in
number of pills for MDMA, i.e. ecstasy).
Predictor variables are time in years and the
number of seizures. A positive coefficient
indicates that with an increasing number of
seizures, the amount seized increases,
whereas a negative coefficient would
indicate that with increasing number of
seizures, the amount seized decreases. This
is interpreted as a policy displacement as it
is assumed to reflect an allocation of scarce
police resources from one area of drug
control to another (i.e. from the wholesale
level to the retail level). In an environment
of unlimited resources, the decision to
increase control of the user level would not
affect the level of control with the whole-
sale level and trafficking offences.
Since a fixed effects model is applied, the
results must be interpreted as within-
cluster results (in this case, within police
districts). That is, the coefficients should be
interpreted as the relationship between
changes within districts, rather than differ-
ences between districts. This is the correct
method for testing the research question
raised in this study, because it reflects how
changing strategy affects outcomes, rather
than how patterns of seizures differ
between districts. A similar fixed effects
model has also previously been used in
studies of how changes in drug policing
have affected outcome at police district
levels and county levels in the USA
(Shepard and Blackley 2005, 2007).
The second research question is examined
by calculating a simple Pearson correlation
between the number of drug law misdemea-
nour offences that have been sanctioned
with a fine and the proportion of the
sanctioned individuals that are of non-
Western origin. ‘Origin’ refers to country
of birth. The number of observations is
small because the practice of recording the
ethnic origin in criminal cases is new. Data
exist at the national level from 2000, but at
police district level only for 2005 to 2008.
The association between number of seizures
and seized amount
From 2000 to 2008 police made more than
68,000 cannabis seizures in Denmark,
MØLLER: POLICING CANNABIS IN DENMARK
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which is approximately 40% more than if
enforcement intensity had stayed at the
level from 2000–2003. Figure 1 illustrates
the trend in number of cannabis seizures
and seized amount. The figure shows how
the increase in the number of cannabis
seizures from 2004 appears to be associ-
ated with a decline in aggregate amount,
both for Copenhagen and at the national
level. The data for all drugs are presented
below in Table 1.
The question regarding a negative
correlation between number of seizures
and seized amount was tested in a fixed
regression model that included all 54 police
districts in Denmark, and the five drugs
that have been consistently registered since
2000, i.e. amphetamine, cocaine, heroin,
MDMA, and cannabis. The results of the
regression models are displayed in Table 2.
For cannabis, there is a significant
negative relationship between within-dis-
trict number of seizures and within-district
amounts (beta ¼ 2 .34, p ¼ .001). For all
other drugs, there is no significant associ-
ation between number and amounts seized,
but the number of seizures increases as
well.
The research question regarding a
negative relationship between number of
seizures and seized amounts is therefore
found to be supported for cannabis.
Sanctioning and origin
Table 3 contains the available data on
distribution of fines for drug misdemea-
nour offences, grouped between persons of
Danish origin and non-Westerners. The
data are for Denmark as a whole.
Firstly, it is clear that a net-widening has
occurred. The number of fines for drug law
misdemeanours was approximately three
times as high in 2006 and 2007 as they
were in 2000 and 2002.
During the years from 2000 to 2006, the
proportion of non-Westerners aged 15–44
who were given a fine for possession of
Figure 1. Cannabis seizures in Copenhagen and Denmark, amount and number, 2000–2008. Source:
www.politi.dk: http://www.politi.dk/NR/rdonlyres/1A6D552B-A5F1-4959-9C86-77C8C68CE
279/0/Beslagsstatistik_2008_antal.pdf; http://www.politi.dk/NR/rdonlyres/0A0AEA03-007A-
4646-A45B-9BB0799391B9/0/Beslagsstatistik_2008_mængde.pdf (accessed 8 December
2009).
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cannabis increased from 2.6 of 1,000 to 6.8
of 1,000, with a peak in 2004 of 7.8 fines
per 1,000 non-Western citizens. During the
same period, the proportion of Danish
citizens and people of Western origin who
were fined increased from 1.6 to 2.4 out of
1,000.
During the same period, the ratio of non-
Westerners to Westerners increased from
1.6 to 2.4 (correlation with time: .90,
p , .01; correlation with observed number
of fines per 1,000 non-Westerners: .77,
p , .05) (dst.dk table BEF3), confirming
the proposition of the second research
question.
Policy displacement from increased focus on
possession offences
The results presented in Table 2 show
that the unprecedented high numbers of
seizures from 2004 to 2007 have been
negatively associated with the aggregate
amount of cannabis seized annually. When
seen in the context of scarce police
resources, this can be interpreted as a
result of policy displacement, i.e. fewer
resources appear to have been devoted to
investigating wholesale and trafficking
cases. There are qualifications to this
interpretation.
Firstly it is important to underline that
even though there is a significant negative
correlation, it is not unusual for aggregate
seizure amounts to display large annual
fluctuations because the major cases take
several years to investigate. From 1990 to
2000 the seized amounts in Denmark had a
normal level between 1.23 and 2.5 tonnes,
but twice in the decade several tonnes were
seized at once, resulting in high points of
10.7 tonnes in 1994 and 14 tonnes in 1999.
Unfortunately the seizure statistics from
1990 to 2000 do not include numbers of
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seizures. Also, Denmark is a small country,
and the numbers are small. In 2006, 2007,
and 2008 there were five, four, and nine
cannabis seizures of amounts over 50 kilos,
respectively (Focal Point 2009). Intuitively
it seems that a single seizure of several
tonnes would have distorted the results.
This possibility is considered in the design
of the regression model. The model
includes all types of illicit drugs and all
the police districts in Denmark so that in
the eventuality of a few large seizures the
distorting effect on the results is minimized.
The significant negative relation-
ship between within-district numbers of
seizures and within-district amounts is
unique for cannabis, compared to seizures
of other drugs. For the other drugs tested in
the model there has been no systematic
displacement between amounts seized and
numbers of seizures. The reason for the
steep increase in cannabis misdemeanours
from 2004 to 2006 is interpreted as being a
result of the relatively sudden change in
formal cannabis policy from 2003 to 2004.
The policy change was formulated as a
clear break with the leniency of the
traditional policy and was immediately
implemented with the crack-down on
Christiania. None of the other illicit drug
Table 2. Relationships between number of seizures and amounts seized using fixed effects
models for each drug.
Coefficient t p . t 95% CI 2 95% CI þ
Cannabis
Year .00 .77 .444 2 .00 .00
Number of seizures per citizen 2 .34 23.36 .001 2 .54 2 .14
Constant 2 .07 2 .76 .448 2 .24 .11
Rho .63 .000
Heroin
Year 2 .00 2 .32 .752 2 .00 .00
Number of seizures per citizen .04 1.98 .050 .00 .07
Constant .00 .32 .752 2 .00 .00
Rho .29 .024
Amphetamine
Year 2 .00 2 .48 .632 2 .00 .00
Number of seizures per citizen .12 1.33 .187 2 .06 .30
Constant .01 .48 .632 2 .02 .04
Rho .26 .086
Cocaine
Year 2 .00 2 .95 .345 2 .00 .00
Number of seizures per citizen .02 .74 .459 2 .03 .07
Constant .00 .95 .344 2 .00 .00
Rho .30 .068
Sources: Police seizure data: http://www.politi.dk/NR/rdonlyres/1A6D552B-A5F1-4959-9C86-77
C8C68CE279/0/Beslagsstatistik_2008_antal.pdf; Census data: Dst.dk table BEF3: http://www.
statistikbanken.dk/statbank5a/default.asp?w¼1280 (accessed 4 January 2010); Dst.dk table BEF5: http://
www.statistikbanken.dk/statbank5a/default.asp?w¼1280 (accessed 4 January 2010).
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markets were subject to crack-downs and
specific police attention during this period.
For drugs other than cannabis there was
also an increase in the number of seizures in
the same period. This can be interpreted as
an overall increased police focus on drug
possession offences. In this sense the period
from 2004 to 2007 can be seen as an
extension of the crack-downs where the
enforcement pressure on users was main-
tained in the vicinity of known markets.
Perhaps when searching for cannabis,
police came upon possession of other illicit
drugs? This remains speculative.
Crack-downs are notoriously expensive
(Sherman 1990), and as such the political
assumption of resource neutrality appears
to have had the unintended consequence of
negatively affecting the control with
wholesalers and traffickers of cannabis.
Street-level sales were arguably the most
pressing social problem associated with
cannabis distribution in Denmark around
2000 to 2004, but in hindsight it turned
out to be an under-estimation of the
adaptability and resilience of the black
market not to ear-mark extra police
resources for a more proactive street-level
policing effort.
Disparate sanctioning of non-Westerners
The analysis of the second research ques-
tion confirmed that there was a systematic
pattern of disparity in the origin of the
sanctioned persons. A similar type of
disparity was found in international studies
on cannabis enforcement, but none of the
studies tested if the association was
systematic in the sense that disparity
increases when enforcement levels
increase, and vice versa. The data used to
examine the second research question areT
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not as robust as we would like, but
international empirical results and theor-
etical explanations support the interpret-
ation of the test as showing a systematic
association.
First, several authors have noted how an
over-representation of non-Westerners is a
general phenomenon of street-level poli-
cing, especially where discretion and
proactivity are required. Drug misdemea-
nours are therefore a particularly good
example because the consensual nature of
the criminal act necessitates proactivity
(Finstad 2000; Holmberg 2000; Holmberg
and Kyvsgaard 2003; Pettersson 2006). In
explaining the over-representation Holm-
berg and Kyvsgaard (2003:137) found the
‘displayed social characteristics’ to pro-
mote a practice that included a ‘bias’
(Beckett et al. 2006), which Holmberg
(2000:179) refers to as ‘typological guilt’.
Finstad (2000) and Holmberg (2000) both
see this tendency towards a bias as an
unavoidable, rational, and even necessary
aspect of street-level policing, because, as
Holmberg (2000:184) writes, ‘discrimi-
nation also means discernment’.
These circumstances are further exacer-
bated by three aspects of non-Western
culture and demography in Denmark.
Firstly there is a cultural practice of using
public space (Gemert and Decker 2008),
secondly the comparably young age of the
subpopulation of non-Western origin (21%
aged 20 to 29 years compared to 10% for
persons of Danish origin in 2008 (dst.dk
table BEF5)), and thirdly, socio-economic
status. Police have a natural tendency of
intensively policing geographic areas
with poorer populations due to higher
crime prevalence rates (Blumstein 1993;
Holmberg and Kyvsgaard 2003). In
combination these circumstances make
young non-Westerners a very visible sub-
population and therefore more at risk from
street-level police control.
The combination of using typological
suspicion in everyday policing with the
cultural and demographic characteristics of
the non-Western subpopulation offers a
plausible explanation for the systematic
over-representation in the sanctioning stat-
istics. The inherent mechanism of using
typological guilt in street-level policing
explains the over-representation of immi-
grants as being directly related to the change
in drug policy priorities, rather than any
discriminatory practices. This interpret-
ation also explains why the degree of over-
representation intensifies with the increase
in enforcement and suggests that this will be
a common pattern when increasing the
street-level policing of consensual crimes
such as cannabis retail distribution.
In this light the disparity is a starting-
point for further analysis more than a
conclusion in itself. The discussion above
highlights two areas we should know more
about. Firstly we know very little about the
drug selling and use practices of this
population. Recent research suggests that,
at a European level, ethnic minorities are
over-represented in open cannabis markets
(Paoli and Reuter 2008) and have higher
cannabis prevalence (Rodham et al. 2005),
but we do not know if this applies in
Denmark as well. Relative indiscretion of
use in public locations could also be a
contributing explanation (Johnson et al.
2006; Feilding et al. 2008). Secondly we do
not know how cannabis possession
offences fit into street-level policing prac-
tices. To what extent are they by-products
of investigating other crimes (May et al.
2007), selective enforcement (Kaplan
1975; Rasmussen and Benson 1994), or
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actually part of a targeted drug control
policy?
Limitations
As this study was based on police districts
as the unit of observation (and years in the
case of the correlation between compo-
sition of origin and number of drug
offences), it was not possible to track
individual characteristics of offenders or
drug users that could be associated with
arrests or convictions, such as gender,
employment status, or criminal history.
Although such variables could potentially
influence the seizures-to-amounts ratio in
unknown ways, there is no direct way in
which they would be likely to influence the
development of the seizures-to-amounts
ratio at the police district level.
Conclusion
A significant association was found
between high numbers of cannabis sei-
zures and a low aggregate amount seized.
This is interpreted as an unintended
consequence of having focused police
resources at the lower levels of distri-
bution. According to the ‘criminal justice
commons’ argument (Rasmussen and
Benson 1994) these resources will be
allocated from somewhere else in the
scarce police budgets. The need to allocate
resources otherwise devoted to investi-
gating wholesalers and trafficking offences
is interpreted as a result of the black
market’s adaptability and resilience. The
geographic dispersal of street-level sales
necessitated an extended police effort both
in time and scope that appears to have
been unexpected to policy-makers. Main-
taining a credible deterrent threat of
criminal sanctioning for participants in
cannabis markets requires an economic
commitment as well.
The indirect social costs of implementing
a more stringently repressive stance on
cannabis possession offences also require
some afterthought. While neither preva-
lence nor actual drug crime rates are
known for the subpopulation of Wester-
ners, they appear to be disproportionately
represented among persons sanctioned
with fines for drug law misdemeanours.
This disparity is explained by policing
practices and various social characteristics
of non-Westerners and is therefore not
interpreted as an example of discrimina-
tory policing. Nonetheless the ascertain-
ment of disparity warrants discussion of
the costs and benefits associated with a
policy focused on policing cannabis at the
street level.
Acknowledgements
Associate Professor Morten Hesse, PhD,
and Associate Professor Kim Bloomfield,
PhD, from the Center of Alcohol and Drug
Research have provided invaluable com-
ments and statistical assistance.
References
Acevedo B (2007). Creating the Cannabis
User—A Post-Structuralist Analysis of the
Re-Classification of Cannabis in the United
Kingdom (2004–2005). International Jour-
nal of Drug Policy 18:177–186.
Asmussen V, Jepsen J (2007). Dansk narkoti-
kakontrolpolitik—aktuelt og historisk
[Danish Drug Control Policy—Currently
and in Historical Perspective]. In: Pedersen
JS (ed.). Ret og samfund [Law and Society].
Kobenhavn: Frydenlund.
MØLLER: POLICING CANNABIS IN DENMARK
Journal of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention 145
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
 
B
y
:
 
[
M
o
e
l
l
e
r
,
 
K
i
m
]
 
A
t
:
 
0
8
:
3
7
 
2
4
 
N
o
v
e
m
b
e
r
 
2
0
1
0
Becker GS (1968). Crime and Punishment: An
Economic Approach. The Journal of Political
Economy 76(2):169–217.
Beckett K, Nyrop K, Pfingst L, Bowen M
(2005). Drug Use, Drug Possession Arrest,
and the Question of Race: Lessons from
Seattle. Social Problems 52:419–441.
Bennett T, Holloway K (2009). The Causal
Connection between Drug Misuse and
Crime. The British Journal of Criminology
49:513–531.
Benson BL, Leburn S, Rasmussen DW (2001).
The Impact of Drug Enforcement on Crime:
An Investigation of the Opportunity Cost of
Police Resources. Journal of Drug Issues
31(4):989–1006.
Benson B, Rasmussen DW, Kim I (1998).
Deterrence and Public Policy: Trade-Offs in
the Allocation of Police Resources. Inter-
national Review of Law and Economics
18:77–100.
Benson BL, Rasmussen DW, Sollars DL
(1995). Police Bureaucracies, Their Incen-
tives, and the War on Drugs. Public Choice
83:21–45.
Blumstein A (1993). Racial disproportionality
of U.S. prison populations revisited. Univer-
sity of Colorado Law Review 64:743–760.
Brydensholt HH (1972). Narkotika og straf
[Drugs and Punishment]. Kobenhavn: Jur-
istforbundets forlag.
Caulkins JP, MacCoun R (2003). Limited
Rationality and the Limits of Supply
Reduction. Journal of Drug Issues
33(2):434–457.
Caulkins JP, Menefee R (2009). Is Objective
Risk All That Matters When It Comes to
Drugs? Journal of Drug Policy Analysis
2:1–14.
Caulkins JP, Pacula R (2006). Marijuana
Markets: Inferences from Reports by the
Household Population. Report No. 7. Santa
Monica: RAND Drug Policy Research
Centre.
Caulkins JP, Reuter P (1997). Setting Goals for
Drug Policy—Harm Reduction or Use
Reduction? Addiction 92:1143–1150.
Caulkins JP, Reuter P (2006). Illicit Drug
Markets and Economic Irregularities. Socio-
Economic Planning Sciences 40:1–14.
Caulkins JP, Reuter P (2009). Towards a Harm
Reduction Approach to Enforcement. Safer
Communities 9(1):9–24.
Christie N, Bruun K (1985/1996). Den gode
fiende [A Suitable Enemy]. Oslo: Universi-
tetsforlaget.
Cohen S (1979). The Punitive City: Notes on the
Dispersal of Social Control. Contemporary
Crises 3(4):341–363.
Commission on Narcotic Drugs (2009).
Making Drug Control ‘Fit for Purpose’:
Building on the UNGASS Decade. Vienna:
UNODC.
Curtis R, Wendel T (2007). You’re Always
Training the Dog: Strategic Interventions to
Reconfigure Drug Markets. Journal of Drug
Issues 37:867–892.
dst.dk; table BEF3, Available at: http://www.
statistikbanken.dk/statbank5a/default.
asp?w¼1280 (accessed 4 April 2010).
dst.dk; table BEF5, Available at: http://www.
statistikbanken.dk/statbank5a/default.
asp?w¼1280 (accessed 4 April 2010).
dst.dk; table STRAFNA1. Available at: http://
www.statistikbanken.dk/statbank5a/default.
asp?w¼1280 (accessed 4 April 2010).
Eck J (1995). A General Model of the
Geography of Illicit Retail Markets. In: Eck
J, Weisburd D (eds). Crime and Place. Crime
Prevention Studies Vol. 4. Monsey, NY:
Criminal Justice Press.
EMCDDA—European Monitoring Centre for
Drugs and Drug Addictions (2008). Annual
Report 2007. Lisbon: EMCDDA.
MØLLER: POLICING CANNABIS IN DENMARK
Journal of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention146
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
 
B
y
:
 
[
M
o
e
l
l
e
r
,
 
K
i
m
]
 
A
t
:
 
0
8
:
3
7
 
2
4
 
N
o
v
e
m
b
e
r
 
2
0
1
0
EMCDDA—European Monitoring Centre for
Drugs and Drug Addictions (2009). Annual
Report 2008. Lisbon: EMCDDA.
Erickson PG (1980). Cannabis Criminals—The
Social Effects of Punishment on Drug Users.
Toronto: Addiction Research Foundation.
Feilding A, Room R, Hall W, Lenton S, Reuter P
(2008). Cannabis Policy: Moving Beyond
Stalemate. The Global Cannabis Commis-
sion Report. Oxford: The Beckley Foun-
dation.
Finstad L (2000). Politiblikket [Eye of the
Police]. Oslo: Pax Forlag A/S.
Focal Point (2008). Narkotikasituationen i
Danmark 2008 [The Drug Situation in
Denmark]. Kobenhavn: National Board of
Health.
Focal Point (2009). Narkotikasituationen i
Danmark 2009 [The Drug Situation in
Denmark]. Kobenhavn: National Board of
Health.
Gemert F van, Decker S (2008). Migrant Groups
and Gang Activity: A Contrast between
Europe and the USA. In: Gemert F van,
Peterson D, Lien I (eds). Street Gangs,
Migration and Ethnicity. pp. 15–30. Port-
land USA: Willan Publishing.
Golub A, Johnson B, Dunlap E (2005).
Subcultural Evolution and Illicit Drug Use.
Addiction Research and Theory
13:217–229.
Golub A, Johnson B, Dunlap E (2006).
Smoking Marijuana in Public: The Spatial
and Policy Shift in New York City Arrests,
1992–2003. Harm Reduction Journal
3(22):1–24.
Greve V (2004). Advarsel som strafferetlig
sanktion? [Warnings as a Criminal Sanc-
tion?]. In: Andersen J, Busse J, Fliflet A,
Garde P, Larsen K, Møller J, Olsen J,
Rønsholdt S (eds). Festskrift til Hans
Gammeltoft-Hansen. Kobenhavn: Jurist- og
Økonomforbundets Forlag.
Hakkarainen P, Laursen L, Tigerstedt C
(1996). Introduction: Sisters Are Never
Alike. NAD Publication 31. pp. 9–20.
Helsinki: Nordic Council for Alcohol and
Drug Research.
Harcourt BE, Ludwig J (2007). Reefer Mad-
ness: Broken Windows Policing and Mis-
demeanor Marijuana Arrests in New York
City, 1989–2000. Reaction Essay
6:165–182.
Holmberg L (2000). Discretionary Leniency and
Typological Guilt: Results from a Danish
Study of Police Discretion. Journal of
Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and
Crime Prevention 1:179–194.
Holmberg L, Kyvsgaard B (2003). Are Immi-
grants and Their Descendants Discriminated
against in the Danish Criminal Justice
System? Journal of Scandinavian Studies in
Criminology and Crime Prevention
4:125–142.
Järvinen M, Demant J (forthcoming). The
Normalization of Cannabis Use among
Young People—Symbolic Boundary Work in
Focus Groups. Drugs, Education, Prevention
and Policy.
Jepsen J (1995). Dansk narkopolitik og dansk
narkoforskning i europæisk belysning
[Danish Drug Policy and Drug Research in
a European Context]. Report No. 37.
Stockholm: Nordisk Samarbejdsråd for
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